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Abstract Decision-making barriers challenge port administrators to adapt and build 
resilience to natural hazards. Heavy rains, storms, sea level rise (SLR), and extreme heat 
can damage the critical coastal infrastructure upon which coastal communities depend. 
There is limited understanding of what impedes port decision makers from investing 
resources in climate and extreme weather adaptations. Through semi-structured interviews 
of 30 port directors/managers, environmental specialists, and safety planners at 15 medium- 
and high-use ports of the U.S. North Atlantic, this paper contributes a typology of seven 
key adaptation barriers. We measured shared knowledge of the identified barriers using a 
cultural consensus model (CCM). Knowledge of the barriers that prevent or delay resilience 
investments can help the decision makers direct their resources to help reduce coastal 
vulnerability and support safe and sustainable operations of U.S. ports. Such actions also 
serve to help prepare the marine transportation system for future climate and extreme 
weather events.  
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Introduction  
Port decision makers need to plan for adaptation to storms and extreme weather events to 
reduce risks of disaster and increase the ports’ resilience (NRC 2009, Biesbroek et al. 
2011). Active planning, as opposed to reactive planning (Kretsch, 2016), can help ports 
ensure long-term sustainability. Coastal infrastructures are adapted to climate change by 
protecting their coastlines, elevating their piers, designing for submersion or abandoning 
when the cost of adaptation is not worth the investment (Becker et al. 2018). In 2012, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) described how adaptations require 
“adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli 
or their effects, which moderates harm or exploit beneficial opportunities” (2012, p. 5, 
Taylor 2019). Furthermore, the IPCC warned that researchers would face challenges in 
understanding the processes by which adaptation is occurring and will occur in the future 
(Adger et al. 2007, IPCC 2007). They highlighted that the first step in addressing climate 
change adaptation is to understand the barriers that exist and their context in order to plan 
strategies to overcome them. In response to these concerns, social-scientists started 
studying barriers to climate change (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). 
 Some progress is being made: in the U.S., projects regulated by the Army Corp of 
Engineers (USACE) are incorporating sea level rise (SLR) into their design specifications 
(USACE 2014). Recent studies suggest that some ports are addressing climate change risks 
(Scott et al. 2013, Ng et al. 2018, McEvoy and Mullett 2013, Mullett et al. 2013, Diego 
2018, Stenek et al. 2011, Zeppie) or responding to Hurricane impacts (Becker 2016b). But, 
coastal communities have experienced and continue to experience worsening impacts from 
climate change-related natural hazards (Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe 2014). Although 
these changes are inevitable (IPCC 2012, Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe 2014) damages to 
critical infrastructure can be reduced through the implementation of adaptations that build 
natural hazard resilience (Füssel 2007).  
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 The purpose of this study is to understand barriers to climate and extreme weather 
adaptation for one critical sector of coastal infrastructure: seaports. Using empirical data 
collected from port administrators, we explore how seaport decision makers perceived 
barriers, and whether there was a shared agreement in the identified types of barriers that 
port directors/managers, environmental specialists and safety planners face. Interviewees 
answered questions about the barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation (e.g., 
‘What are some of the challenges to implementing extreme weather adaptation actions at 
your port?’) and their perceptions of the port’s vulnerability. Through analysis of the 
interviews and a literature review on barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation, 
researchers developed a port-specific typology of barriers to climate and extreme weather 
adaptation. 
 Barriers are defined as “… obstacles that can be overcome with concerted effort, creative 
management, change of thinking, and the related shift in resources, land uses, institutions, 
etc.” (Moser and Ekstrom 2010, p. 22027). Building natural hazard resilience depends on 
decision makers overcoming these barriers, so that systems can bounce back quickly 
following a storm event. Several studies identify barriers or propose frameworks to identify 
and analyze them (Moser and Ekstrom 2010, Biesbroek et al. 2013). Fewer studies present 
guidance for interventions (Moser and Ekstrom 2010), or their context (Biesbroek et al. 
2013), or how to build the adaptive capacity necessary to overcome such barriers (Siders, 
2019). In 2010, Moser and Ekstrom addressed these limitations in a comprehensive policy 
framework for identifying and analyzing barriers that also provided guidance for capacity-
building interventions (Moser and Ekstrom 2010).  
 Barriers to adaptation can be institutional (Adger et al. 2007, Barnett et al. 2013), or 
socio-cultural (Burch 2010); these can also be informational, financial, and cognitive 
(Adger et al. 2007). Differences and subjectivity arise when trying to categorizing barriers 
(Jones and Boyd 2011), but typologies such as the one proposed here increase our general 
understanding of where opportunities lie for overcoming such challenges. Barriers to 
adaptation in the spheres of governance can be explained (Adger and Barnett 2009, Adger, 
Lorenzoni, and O'Brien 2009, Moser and Ekstrom 2010, Barnett et al. 2013) as challenges 
in leadership, caused by uncertainty in the roles and responsibilities across different levels 
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of governance (Moser and Ekstrom 2010, Barnett et al. 2013). These challenges are also 
reflected in barriers reported in policy initiatives (Tompkins et al. 2010), many of which are 
intensified by the uncertainty in climate change projections (Barnett et al. 2013). In a study 
on barriers conducted in Australia, Barnett et al. described five main barriers to adaptation 
for coastal communities, these are: governance, policy, uncertainty, resources, and 
psychosocial factors. The study also recognized the shared responsibility of key actors in  
adapting to sea level rise, and the role played by different levels of governance (Barnett et 
al. 2013). 
 Biesbroek et al.’s studies highlight that while some barriers to climate and extreme 
weather adaptation are not necessarily climate change specific (2013), others stem from the 
“long term impacts of climate change versus the short term dynamics of politics and 
decision-making; the reliance on scientific models to identify, understand and communicate 
problem and propose solutions, and the inherent uncertainty and ambiguities of climate 
change” (Biesbroek et al. 2013, P. 1124). 
 Similar to general barriers to adaptation mentioned earlier, ports are also challenged by 
the complexity of their governance and leadership (Becker and Caldwell 2015), as well as 
by a lack of communication between key stakeholders (Ng et al. 2018). As the National 
Research Council (NRC) notes, effective climate adaptation will require all types of 
decision makers and stakeholders to participate (NRC 2010). Others emphasize on the 
importance of adopting an ‘adaptation pathways’, a process for planning that enables 
decision makers to assess climate changes within broader context that address societal 
transitions and transformations (Wise et al. 2014). 
 In the following sections, we present the methods of our study, the study sites, and 
analysis, followed by the results on decision makers’ perceptions of barriers to climate and 
extreme weather adaptation in 15 ports of the North Atlantic. Port directors, environmental 
specialists and safety officers’ perceptions on the barriers to climate and extreme weather 
adaptation are presented, along with the context in which they were discussed during the 
interviews. In the discussion, we expand on the implications of these findings. Improving 
decision-making to adapt ports to climate and extreme weather events can only decrease 
 5 
future risks and increase a seaports resilience to these impacts. In the long term, coastal 
cities face dramatic changes from sea level rise and eventually many ports may no longer 
be viable due to inundation. However, assessing where federal resources should be 
directed, and where future key investments can be made sustain operations of major ports is 
an essential step towards increasing resilience of the maritime transportation system (Hsieh 
2014, Becker et al. 2014, Chhetri et al. 2014).  
Methods 
This study investigates seaport-specific barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation 
for 15 Medium and High-use ports in the North Atlantic. Between November 2017 and 
February 2018, our research team interviewed 30 decision makers in order to develop a 
framework for perceptions of the barriers1 to climate and extreme weather adaptation. The 
data were also used to develop a cultural consensus model to measure the decision makers’ 
consensus on the barriers. Port decision makers in this study are defined as port 
directors/managers, environmental specialists and safety planners who have responsibility 
for decision making related to climate and extreme weather resilience. Not all ports have 
representatives for these positions. For some ports, aspects of these roles are outsourced to 
private consultants. In most areas, harbor masters and the U.S. Coast Guard have additional 
responsibility for the safety planning of coastal infrastructure in a region. However, this 
study was limited to employees of the ports who are charged with leadership and decision 
making within the studied ports. The responsibilities of each group are described in Table 
1.  
Table 1  Description of responsibilities of port decision maker positions. 
Position Number 
interviewed 
Responsibilities 
 
1 Interview protocol and procedures were approved by the Institute of Review Board at the University of Rhode Island 
(IRB Approved 894694-8). Interviewees were informed of the purpose of the study and that they give a written or oral 
consent to being interviewed and being recorded (for transcription purposes only). The majority of interviews (73%, 
22/30) were conducted in person, 27% were conducted over the phone, 10 of the ports were visited. 
 6 
Directors or managers 
Common titles: 
  - executive director  
  - director of operations 
  - project manager 
 
17 • Run port operations and systems 
(short or long term) 
• Perform maintenance of vessels 
and facilities 
• Supervise employees 
• Manage specific functions of port 
facilities 
• Plan efficient use of port 
resources, with attention to 
security, safety, and health of 
personnel 
Environmental specialists 
Common titles: 
  - marine environment  
     & civil engineering consultant 
  - manager of strategic planning  
  - harbor master  
  - environmental manager 
  - project manager                               
- climate mitigation and                                                                  
.  resilience manager 
8 • Monitor related environmental 
regulations 
• Oversee environmental 
protection and       other social 
responsibility functions. 
Safety planners 
 
Common titles: 
  - vice president of sustainability 
(consultant) 
  - chief harbor  
    safety strategist and  
    operations assistant 
5 • Monitor and assess hazardous 
and unsafe situations  
• Develop guidelines for personnel 
safety 
 
 Management and governance structures vary across the ports. Those without a port 
authority are privately owned or managed by a private entity in the name of the state (Table 
2). Because the number of decision makers and their years’ experience can influence 
perceptions, these data are also included in Table 2. 
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Table 2  Demographics representing the study’s participating decision makers. 
    
Number of participating ports 15/22 
Ports with port authority 9/15 
Number of interviews 30 
Types of decision makers  
Directors and managers 17 
Safety planners 8 
Environmental specialists 5 
  
Years of Experience  
<5 7 
5 - 10 7 
11 - 20 8 
> 20 8 
Range of experience 1 - 46 (years)  
 
Gender of decision makers 
      Female 8/30 
      Male 22/30 
 
Data Collection 
Interviews were conducted at 15 out of 22 medium- and high-use ports of the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) North Atlantic Divisioni (CENAD) (S 1). The ports 
were selected in consultation with the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development 
Center (ERDC) to represent ports with a varying degree of risk to major hurricanes.  
 There were two sections of the semi-structured interviews, with nine and eight questions 
respectively (S 2). The first section sought to understand perceptions of barriers to climate 
and extreme weather adaptation, and the second to understand perceptions of port 
vulnerability. Questions were open-ended, hence, the absence of a mention of a barrier does 
not mean that the port is not challenged by it, but that other challenges were more palpable 
to interviewee (S 2). 
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Data analysis 
The analysis was divided into three steps. First, we coded responses to identify the major 
barriers as perceived by respondents. Second, we ran a the cultural consensus model 
(CCM) using ANTHROPAC 6.46 software (Borgatti 1996) to assess agreement between 
different respondents. The CCM assumes that there is a shared cultural knowledge and 
aggregates individual “culturally correct responses” to measures the level of agreement 
between individuals (Weller 2007, Romney, Batchelder, and Weller 1987). A Pearson 
correlation coefficient value indicates if there is an association between two variables 
measures associations or agreement between the subjects. Third, we compared the 
responses across the categories to identify patterns or variation in the responses across the 
different decision makers groups. 
 After the transcription of the interviews, we coded the transcripts line-by-line using the 
NVivo qualitative data analysis software package (NVivo 2014). Reviewing the transcripts, 
we identified and classified the barriers, and resolved coding differences between 
researchers’ assessments where necessary2, following the process laid out by Ekstrom and 
Moser (2014). The coding scheme used an iterative process based on grounded theory 
(Charmaz 2006, Glaser and Strauss 2017). Statements characterized as a constraint, a 
challenge, or a limitation to the adaptation process, were coded as a potential barrier. This 
process allowed for views and concepts to emerge and be grouped into unique categories.  
Results 
The analysis of the 30 decision makers interviews  from 15 ports in the North Atlantic 
resulted in the identification of seven perceived barriers to climate and extreme weather 
adaptation  (Figure 1). Barriers include: the lack of understanding of the risks (mentioned 
by 93% of responses), lack of funding (77%), perceived levels of risks do not exceed the 
action threshold (70%), governance disconnect (67%), physical constraints (67%), lack of 
communication amongst individuals (7%), and the problem (of adaptation) is 
 
2 NVivo Coding comparison between coders; in the initial coding phase, yielded a 0.696 Kappa value (Values between 
0.40 - 0.75 = fair to good agreement). 
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overwhelming (7%). Figure 1 shows the number of respondents that mentioned at least one 
barrier from each of the seven categories at least one time during the interview.  
Figure 1  Seven barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptations resulted from 30 interviews in 15 North 
Atlantic ports. The value above each colored pie is the percentage of respondents who mentioned that barrier 
within the decision maker type (directors/managers, environmental specialists, safety planners). Blue numbers 
are the total frequency of the responses. The blue-outlined pie is the overall percentage of responses for a 
barrier. 
 
 The following section presents the results of the cultural consensus model (CCM) and 
then explains each of the seven major categories of the identified barriers. 
The cultural consensus model results 
Fit to the cultural consensus model (CCM) is given by the factor ratio of 3 to 1 or greater, 
that is a standard indication of clustering. We deemed eigenvalue ratio of 2.91as sufficient 
evidence of conditional independence between factor 1 and 2, and evidence of shared 
knowledge (Borgatti 1996).  The percentages of the responses in our data show a strong 
cultural pattern, meaning that respondents have a high agreement in their responses. When 
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the factor ratio is smaller than 3 this indicates that respondents divide into ‘two’ or ‘more’ 
populations –meaning that their views are not homogeneous.  
The competence score in the CCM represents a measure of respondents’ shared knowledge. 
For the studied group, the average competence score is 0.598, and the values range from 
0.981 (highest agreement) to 0.067 (low or absence of agreement) (Table 3). As an 
example, when two respondents answered that barrier #1 and barrier #2 were the main 
challenges, their competence score could be closer to ‘1’, or 0.981. But when a third 
respondent who mentioned barrier #3 to be most important, its competence score could be 
closer to 0.598. The closer their competence score is closer to ‘1’, the higher is their 
agreement with the mean, and the closer the competence score is to ‘0’, the lesser is their 
agreement. 
Table 3  Cultural consensus model analysis: consensus for 30 port decision makers on the perceived barriers 
to climate and extreme weather adaptation. The factor loading is measure of the variance of the observed 
variables a factor explains more variance than a single observed variable. 
 
First  
Factor 
2nd  
Factor 
1st to 2nd 
factor ratio 
 
Average 
"competency" 
Sample (n = 30) 14.282 4.905 2.912 
 
0.598 
 (St. Dev. 0.25) 
 
Typology of seven key barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation for 
seaports  
This section describes the seven categories of barriers, and how decision makers in 
different categories perceived them. Each barrier is explained within the context in which it 
was mentioned by the respondent, and some examples are provided. For example, the 
barrier lack of understanding of risks was mentioned in the context of confusion over the 
level of risk and the difficulty of predicting where (or if) impacts will be (For further details 
on the context in which each barrier is mentioned see S 3). Distinct responses and 
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differences in viewpoints of given groups were also highlighted. In parenthesis, the 
respondent category is noted, as follows: DIR = Port Director, ES = Environmental 
Specialist, SP = Safety Planner.  
 The respondents not only mentioned one barrier to adaptation, but multiple ones when 
being interviewed, we illustrate this complexity in Figure 2. For example, seven 
directors/managers are represented in A. One director could have mentioned up to five of 
the seven adaptation barriers during the interview. Similarly, in part B all the safety officers 
that participated mentioned from two to five barriers (Figure 2).  
Figure 2  The complexity of the responses: one respondent can mention one to five different barriers. (A) 
Ports at which directors mentioned up to five of the identified adaptation barriers. (B) The five interviewed 
safety officers also mentioned the same five barriers. 
 
 The distribution of responses across all decision makers categories illustrates how 
barriers are perceived by type of decision maker, with further context provided (Figure 3 
and S 3). To illustrate these differences, the 15 ports (labeled ports A - N) are organized  
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Figure 3  Barriers and the responses by ports and the participating decision makers. The colors in each box 
denote when respondents in each decision maker group that mentioned the barrier at least one time. The color 
denotes agreement (green), or absence of agreement (grey). 
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by the number of decision maker categories who participated. First, the ports where only 
directors/managers participated are presented, then ports where port directors/managers and 
either environmental specialist or safety officers participated are presented, and lastly, ports 
where all of them participated. Agreement on a barrier category is coded in green, and 
absence of agreement, in grey. The columns represent the decision makers categories for 
the 15 different ports, and the rows indicate whether or not they mentioned a given barrier 
to adaptation. In descending order of frequency (1 > 7), the barriers mentioned most 
frequently also present highest agreement level for the decision makers categories. 
Secondly, in ports where all decision makers participated (Ports D, H & L), almost all of 
the respondents agreed that lack of understanding of risks was a barrier, but one 
environmental specialist—out of a team of two—mentioned lack of funding, and perceived 
risks do not meet action threshold. 
Barrier 1  Lack of understanding of risks 
The lack of understanding of risks was mentioned by 28 of 30 respondents (Figure 3), 
representing 13 of 15 ports. Many of the decision makers mentioned lack of understanding 
of risks as it related to the difficulty in predicting impacts or if the hazard will occur, like 
where at their port the flooding might occur (S 3). Many felt that severe weather events in 
the past (if there were any) did not serve as predictions for the future. As an example, one 
respondent said “. . . The storm was over 50miles/hours gusts, but we typically don't see a 
whole lot of these [level of the storm]” (DIR).  Sometimes, expected damages do not occur 
or require an unanticipated response. In another example, one decision maker said: “. . . the 
flooding was coming from the other way . . . from a direction people were not expecting it . 
. .” (ES) 
 Respondents described resilience planning as often being reactionary and myopic, with 
ports engaging in mitigation planning only after a natural hazard and then preparing to 
respond to similar hazards in the future based on the latest experience, rather than for the 
full range of plausible events.  As one decision maker said, “I think that we have done 
enough . . . measure[ing] ourselves up against the next Hurricane Sandy . . . But 
unfortunately, the reality is Sandy was not nearly as bad as it could have been.” (DIR). 
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Another explained , “. . . because we got hit with flooding and surge, we . . . react [only] to 
flooding and surge . . . there is not really a focus on the other hazards we are facing.” (SP). 
Others emphasized the need to understand the full suite of risk, not just the risk at the 
terminal itself, stating, “Even if our terminals are resilient, getting goods and services off 
the terminal and over the transportation network might pose challenges if . . . networks are 
not adequately resilient.” (ES). Environmental specialists emphasized the need to conduct 
regular risks assessments to help overcome this barrier. 
Barrier 2  Lack of funding 
Twenty-three of 30 respondents mentioned lack of funding (Figure 1), defined here as the 
absence of financial resources or the absence of trained human resources to implement the 
needed adaptations (Figure 3 and S 3). In Figure 3, the levels of agreement are represented 
by their percentages, along with the number of mentions per decision maker category. Lack 
of funding referred to both capital costs and maintenance costs, as well as costs related to 
planning and assessment. Maintenance, for example, provides an opportunity to make 
improvements that integrate resilience to climate and extreme weather considerations. 
However, planning for smarter, longer-term resilience also adds cost. One director 
explained, “We inherited some old facilities at the port and are . . . rehabilitating our main 
pier . . . built in 1956. . .” But, as the words of another director at the port made clear, 
building in resilience measures on these projects “. . . comes down to money.” (DIR) 
 Decision makers explained how funding for resilience was in competition with other 
pressing needs. As ships get larger, waterways become too narrow or shallow to 
accommodate them. This issue often trumps resilience challenges, as ports must keep pace 
and spend capital on dredging channels or purchasing larger cranes. Compliance with 
environmental regulations was also perceived as diverting monies away from resilience.  
As respondent stated, “. . . the commercial fishing industry, with all the regulatory 
problems that they have, can't bear the financial burden [of resilience investment].” (DIR) 
Compliance other regulations, such as the American Disabilities Act (ADA), can increase 
the costs of adaptation, especially when space is limited. An environmental specialist 
mentioned the port’s electrical components’ exposure to climate and extreme weather 
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events, noting that newer technology does not always perform under extreme weather 
conditions. Another noted that “electrical substations are very low and not elevated 
sufficiently . . . they could be elevated, but it is a huge expense.” (ES). All of these financial 
challenges are further complicated by limited available funding and the complexity of 
retrofitting a port. 
Barrier 3  Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold  
Twenty-one of 30 respondents mentioned perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold 
(Figure 1). Here, there is risk awareness, but the risk has not exceeded a magnitude or 
intensity to prompt an action. It is related to barrier two (a lack of understanding of the 
risks) but was discussed in the context of ports being unwilling to invest in the unknown. In 
the words of one environmental specialist, “It is a cost-benefit risk management decision to 
say how much are you willing to spend for an event that may—or may not ever—take place 
. . .” (ES).  Disruptions challenge port operations and reconstruction affects the ability to 
keep up with operations, given that ports often operate at near-capacity. Decision makers 
emphasized that the mission of terminals is to serve their customers, which means, “. . . get 
more product in and get it out of the gate.” (DIR) Although they acknowledged the need for 
adaptation to natural hazards, they prioritize immediate tasks related to standard operations, 
maintenance, and replacement of equipment. The safety planners mentioned that decision 
makers lack the will to invest due to this difficulty in predicting the future. Resilience 
investment is especially difficult for ports that have little or no experience with severe 
storms or flooding events. “We need to change the culture and start to think . . . forward . . . 
get in the right mindset of ‘this is . . . real’ . . . we need to face it.” (SP) 
 Some directors and safety officer perceived that agency culture is not forward thinking 
or that the science was not sound. “I am not convinced that there is climate change.” (DIR). 
In the opinion of a safety planner “You know, the weather fluctuates! I am trained to look 
at facts and in some cases statistics and evidence.” (SAF) 
 16 
Barrier 4  Physical constraints limit adaptation options  
Twenty out of 30 respondents mentioned physical constraints limit options, including 14 
directors, four environmental specialists, and two safety planners (Figure 1). These 
location-specific factors or physical/geographical-specific characteristics limit the options 
for the port’s infrastructure adaptation. Many noted that facilities were under-designed for 
present and future conditions, but expansion of ports into nearby areas, or adaptations along 
the river that could allow floodwaters to escape, were impossible—simply because the 
coastline was already developed.  
Both the directors and the environmental specialists explained this barrier in similar terms 
(Figure 3), explaining that refitting ports is both a challenge and an opportunity. Extensive 
yard areas would need to be elevated, but “. . . every time you invest, it is an opportunity to 
give it [the port/port infrastructure] more lifespan.” (ES) 
 Safety planners mentioned that current facilities are under-designed and practical 
solutions are lacking, in his words, “Right here [around the port authority headquarters], the 
challenge is to keep the water from coming up into the side. So, if you had that wall in 
place [to protect from storm surge, you risk] trapping the rainfall water in.” (SP) (See S 3). 
Barrier 5 – Governance disconnect  
Governance disconnect was mentioned by 20 of 30 respondents (Figure 1): 11 port 
directors, six environmental specialists, and three safety planners (Figure 1 and S 2). For 
directors, this barrier ranked second after the lack of understanding of the risks. Ineffective 
governance can result from lack of coordination across sectors, or across levels of 
organization, or both. Sometimes, governance is complex for a multi-entity system, 
challenged by an absence of coordination or direction. This leads to a lack of clarity on who 
decides on infrastructure resilience investment priorities. Nine of the 15 participating ports 
in the study were governed by a municipal or regional port authority (Table 2). The 
remaining six were either privately owned or had an agency acting as a corporate trust on 
behalf of the port owners. In addition, “There are multiple terminals that operate within the 
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port that are private” (ES). In regard to deciding on the needed investments, one safety 
planner asked, “Who is going to pay for adaptations? . . . to control it? . . . to maintain it?” 
(SP). Respondents saw the complexity of multi-entity planning as a limiting factor (Figure 
3), with one stating, “I think that as the port operators, we are probably not looking to make 
those investments.” Asked if the port has a management plan that considers climate and 
extreme weather resilience, this environmental specialist said he was not aware of one. “We 
haven't been asked to develop one, so I don't think that [we] have one specific for natural 
hazards.” (ES)  
 Directors also spoke of the challenges of being a multi-entity organization where 
facilities and terminals under the port’s authority had different landlords and different 
management frameworks. Respondents often described the administration of ports as being 
fragmented. “Long-term, [making a decision to] raise the land would be extremely 
challenging with how fragmented everything is down here.” (DIR). Another said that while 
he had a good relationship with the private owners of the port facility, he was not aware of 
their climate adaptation plans.  
 Respondents also explained that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
only compensates for the costs of bringing the port back up to the required basic code after 
a disaster. This gives ports little incentive to elevate their infrastructure beyond the 
minimum required, as some respondents mentioned: 
FEMA will give you a reimbursement to put a set of offices (like an office trailer) 
back where it was, and you don't have to elevate it. The code may require you to 
elevate, but FEMA doesn't necessarily give you any additional compensation 
beyond what the basic code requirement is.’ (DIR) 
 Safety planners highlighted this barrier as driven by political decisions, “. . . we got to 
play politics to get the finances.” (SP). Or they believed a cause was a lack of direction 
from above or the result of ports not being prioritized in large-scale regional planning.  
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Barrier 6 – Lack of communication amongst individuals 
Lack of communication amongst individuals was mentioned by only one director and one 
environmental specialist (Figure 1 and Figure 3). This barrier relates to keeping staff and 
stakeholders informed of changes in climate and weather events, as well as adaptation 
strategies, in order to be prepared to sustain port operations. The director noted, 
“Communication is always the key, making sure that our staff is informed about our plans 
moving forward to adapt to the changing weather patterns, communicating with the 
captains of the vessels.” (DIR). The environmental specialist saw recent improvements in 
communications but added, “But, that [communications] can definitely be an issue from 
time to time.” (ES) 
Barrier 7 – The problem is overwhelming 
The Problem is overwhelming was mentioned by one director and one environmental 
specialist (Figure 3 and Table 4). This barrier relates to the enormity of the climate change 
problem and humans’ inability to reverse course on global warming. These two respondents 
felt that regardless of how much the port prepares, it will always be vulnerable:  
“… you cannot control mother nature, the severity of it. For a hurricane to come 
through, there is only so much you can do. You are never going to come out of it 
unscathed. So, obviously, there are challenges with all that. Although you can 
prepare, . . . you are always vulnerable at some of these extreme weather changes.” 
(DIR) 
Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the implications of these findings in the context of other barriers 
to adaptation studies. Results outline a typology of adaptation barriers and conditions as 
perceived by port decision makers in 15 ports. The consensus in decision makers’ 
perceptions was measured to identify gaps and trends in their knowledge (Romney, 
Batchelder, and Weller 1987). The high level of agreement shared by port decision makers 
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–as well as their understanding of the port’s vulnerability (S 4) -- can be used to inform 
conversations and collaborations to build port resilience in the North Atlantic region.  
 The barrier lack of understanding of risk by governance, or leadership, can explain the 
lack of will to invest (Barnett et al. 2013); an outcome that is closely linked to perceived 
risks do not exceed an action threshold, and/or to lack of funding. Rational decision making 
depends on an individual’s understanding of risks, to plan an adaptation action, and to 
manage the implementation of strategies (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Some of the 
challenges in understanding the risks, are related to differences between long-term impacts 
of barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation and the short-term [societal] 
dynamics that makes adaptation planning difficult (Biesbroek et al. 2013). Sometimes, the 
most effective motive leading to adaptive behavior is having experienced recent extreme 
weather events (Whitmarsh 2008, Cahoon, Pateman, and Chen 2013, Smythe 2015). To 
solve for the lack of understanding of the risks, ports could conduct regular risk or 
vulnerability assessment that consider plausible scenarios under various climate futures 
(USDOT 2013, Scott et al. 2013, IPCC 2014, Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe 2014); or, 
similar to this study, they could assess ports stakeholders’ barrier to adaptation perceptions, 
or their perceptions of risks posed by climate change (Yang et al. 2016). Furthermore, 
proactively analyzing societal constrains to adaptation as they relate to values, rules and 
knowledge would provide needed decision-makers additional information and context 
(Gorddard et al. 2012). 
 Improving infrastructure to withstand more frequent extreme events is often delayed due 
to the lack of financial resources (Eisenack et al. 2014). This barrier of lack of funding is 
explained in other studies in the context of a governance void (Hajer 2003), absence of 
leadership (Becker et al. 2014, Kretsch 2016, Becker and Kretsch 2019) or lack of will to 
invest (Vine 2012, Barnett et al. 2013). Such delays can also be explained by misaligned 
short-term dynamics of politics and the long-term changes of climate and extreme events 
(Biesbroek et al. 2013). As an example, an elected city mayor often makes decisions that 
promote him/her during their 4-5 years appointment without considering the enduring 
consequences of these decisions on climate change impacts. To address the lack of funding, 
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decision makers mentioned that a change of culture is needed, after all, ports need to keep 
their competitive edge—looking into the future, the investments of today depended on the 
investments of the past (Crabbé and Robin 2006, Hallegatte 2009, Pechan 2014).  
 The physical constraints limit options to adaptation included aging infrastructure, 
geophysical restraints and the ports physical exposure. Port facilities were described as 
being presently under-designed, for present day and future conditions. However, both the 
directors and the environmental specialist saw refitting of the ports as both a challenge and 
an opportunity to give the port, and its infrastructure, more lifespan.  
 Governance disconnect may simply result in the lack of a management plan for climate 
and extreme weather adaptation (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Decision makers in this study 
described the complexity of planning within a multi-entity organization. This disconnect is 
described by others in the context of institutional crowdedness and institutional void, or in 
the context of institutional or governance fragmentation (Biesbroek 2011, Ekstrom and 
Moser 2014), explained by a lack of clarity of responsibilities for adaptation at local levels 
(Huitema, Aerts, and van Asselt 2008, Ekstrom, Moser, and Tom 2011, Mukheibir et al. 
2013, Ekstrom and Moser 2014). Others have emphasized on the importance of 
understanding the interdependencies that exist between institutions, values, rules, and 
knowledge in order to facilitate an make needed changes in decision- making and 
adaptation (Stern et al. 1999, Head 2010, Gorddard et al. 2012). This barrier is not singular 
to climate and extreme weather adaptation, but present in many types of governance 
dealing with a complex problem (Eisenack et al. 2014). It can be political—because of 
costs; in some cases, an elected official will defer adaptation because of the high costs 
(Vine 2012). When considering local, state and federal governance, different governance 
levels would be best suited to address different responsibilities (Mukheibir et al. 2013). One 
of the most important steps an organization can take to overcome problems with 
governance disconnects is “the inclusion of adaptation and mitigation in their annual 
operative plans and budget allocations” (Zambrano-Barragán, Zevallos O., and Enri quez 
2010, p. 1). 
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 Climate and extreme weather adaptation will always be affected by political interest 
contesting for support from municipalities (Keen, Mahanty, and Sauvage 2006); it is said 
that climate adaptation policies as strategies are at a level of infancy (Cusano, Ferrari, and 
Tei 2016). Regulatory change is often long-term in scope, and political agendas are short-
term in scope, making alignment of agendas challenging (Stocker 2013). 
 Others propose an incremental approach of “extensions of actions and behaviors that 
already reduce the losses that can enhance the benefits of natural variations in climate and 
extreme events.” (Kates et al. 2001; pg. 641). In this regard, to promote pro-active actions 
towards strategic adaptation, both environmental specialists and safety planners interviewed 
in this study favored regulatory changes. Regulatory changes that align with a resilience 
mandate requires an active leadership in ports that is preoccupied with adaptations. This 
type of leadership could influence the allocation of resources to both safeguard the port and 
serve the surrounding areas and communities. The role of the responsible actors that are 
actively engaged in decision making and climate change adaptations, cannot be 
underestimated, and although the decision makers can be informed of many positive 
benefits and social-economic outcomes to prioritize on needed adaptations –without a 
regulatory mandate -- their governance will continue be constrained by short-term 
budgetary cycles (Burch 2010) or outdated constructions standards.  
 Decision makers mentioned the governance disconnects that arise when collaborating 
with other agencies. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) might favor 
investment in preparation, response, and recovery for disaster (FEMA2015) and provide 
less funding for mitigation activities (Becker and Caldwell 2015).  
 Lack of communication related to the need to keep port stakeholders informed of risks, 
as well as of adaptation strategies. In 2011, Biesbroek et al. also identified lack of 
awareness and lack of communication as a barrier to climate change adaptations. In their 
study, lack of awareness, or media misinformation influenced public and government 
support needed for climate adaptation (Biesbroek et al. 2011). Also, Ng et al. in their study 
of ports in Canada, found communication to be a constrained; here stakeholders outlined 
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the port’s inefficient ‘go at it alone’ model with inadequate information between port 
authorities and port operators (Ng et al. 2018). One way in which ports can address barriers 
to climate and extreme weather adaptation  is through the establishment of a partnership 
approach that integrates multiple stakeholders (Becker 2016a). Cone et al. highlight the 
importance of bringing more people into the conversation, as interactions between planners 
and stakeholders raise the mutual understanding of potential resilience strategies (Cone et 
al. 2013).  
 Misinformation or misinterpretation of available data further challenges decision makers 
(Cone et al. 2013). More work is needed to integrate a larger number of port stakeholders in 
the conversation, to identify and overcome barriers (Biesbroek et al. 2013). Efforts should 
expand to understand risks both at the port and their neighboring communities through, for 
example, promoting a multi-way communication model (McQuail 1987) that helps 
rationalize climate risk and uncertainty data in a way that best connects effective plans and 
actions among stakeholders and port decision makers. Such an approach can reduce barriers 
of communication by enhancing monitoring and learning processes that integrate research, 
tools and best available data.  
 In the table below, additional recommendation actions are outlined for each the different 
decision maker type (Table 4). 
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Table 4  Additional recommendations for adaptation actions port decision makers can implement (directors 
and managers, safety officers and environmental specialists 
 
Conclusions  
The results of this study suggest that North Atlantic medium and high-use port decision 
makers’ perceived barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation fall into seven 
categories. The 30 interviewed port decision makers have consensus on the barriers that 
prevent them from implementing resilient adaptations to address risks from storms and 
extreme weather events. Port authorities and port administrators, together with state, 
federal, and private agencies, can help port decision makers in planning actions to reduce or 
remove the barriers to increase the resilience of their ports in a holistic manner. Directors, 
Port directors & managers Environmental specialists Safety planners 
(1) Work with regulatory agencies to develop 
regulatory changes that encourage resilience 
and provide financial incentives. 
(1) Integrate climate risks 
assessments into the port 
management plan. 
(1) Integrate climate risks 
assessment into the port 
management plan. 
(2) Lead managers, port operators, and 
others in organizing and establishing 
working groups and developing emergency 
response strategies (flood barriers, etc.) 
(2) Organize working 
groups to address climate 
risk 
(2) Organize working groups to 
address climate risk. 
(3) Promote learning opportunities, 
acquisition of data and communication tools, 
to enhance understanding of risks. 
I.e., Encourage a multi-way communication 
model of communication to downscale 
climate risk and uncertainty data, connecting 
direct plans and actions among stakeholders 
and the authorities. 
(3) Acquire and provide 
information on 
environmental risks and 
climate change uncertainty 
as it pertains to 
environmental concerns 
(3) Organize drill exercises to 
enhance the ability of port 
personnel to respond to natural 
disasters. 
Outline port safety risks and 
uncertainties and plans/actions 
needed to reduce them. 
(4) Direct working groups to update port 
master plans to include relevant SLR 
projections, and/or to develop risk 
assessments. 
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environmental specialists, and safety planners, together with other port administrators and 
informed stakeholders can implement the adaptation processes: understanding the barriers, 
evaluating strategies and carrying out their implementation and evaluation. Together with 
collaborative approaches and better communication flows, adaptation should be facilitated 
and supported at the state and national levels.  Greater involvement of port tenants and 
diverse port stakeholders would also increase the understanding of the risks and generate a 
greater sense of responsibility. 
 While some barriers identified here can be overcome through political will, broader 
conceptualization of practices that allow for adaptation practices need to be considered. 
Furthermore, researchers and decision makers need to develop a deeper understanding of 
the interdependencies that exist between institutions, their values, rules, and the knowledge, 
beliefs and values of port stakeholders. Analyzing societal constraints to adaptation can 
provide context that enables decision makers to take steps and plan strategic actions to 
address the challenges they face.  
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Decision maker Barriers to Extreme Weather Adaptation for Seaports: A Cultural 
Consensus Model for Medium and High-Use Ports in the North Atlantic 
 
Demographics 
1. Name of the port __________________________________ 
2. What is your position? ______________________________ 
3. Number of years you have been working as a port manager/safety planner/environmental specialist? 
_______ 
Understanding Barriers 
4.  Do you feel your port has done enough to address extreme weather concerns? (why or why not?) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
5a. Does your port have a management plan that considers long - term planning for natural hazards 
resilience? (Y/N) ___  
 5b. Are there some short-term actions to be planned to increase resilience? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
5c. Which, if any, extreme weather impacts does this address? Which other natural hazards? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
7. What are some of the challenges to implement extreme weather adaptation actions at your port? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
8. You mentioned challenges to implementing adaptation actions (Q7). What resources would enable you 
to overcome these challenges? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
9. What could happen to your port if needed adaptations to extreme weather were not addressed? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Conceptualizing Seaport Vulnerability to extreme weather impacts (the CCM) 
1. What does “seaport vulnerability to extreme weather impacts” mean to you? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Which components of the physical infrastructure of your port are exposed to: 
 a.  extreme weather tide-related flooding? ___________________ 
 b. surge damage? _______________________________________ 
 c.  or extreme temperatures? ______________________________ 
3. How would the exposure of your port change with a predicted sea level rise of 2 feet in the next two 
years? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. How does your port prepare for an imminent storm (Adaptive Capacity)? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
5. Compared to other ports in the North Atlantic, what is one thing your port is doing well to increase its 
ability to prepare to extreme events or natural hazards?  
6. Sensitivity is explained by the level to which a system is changed or affected. This can cause problems 
or lead to new opportunities.  What facilities of your port do you consider to be sensitive to extreme 
weather impacts? ______________________________________________________________________ 
7a. How do you think your port would cope if the sea level would rise by 2 feet in 2020? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
   7b. How does this prediction change in the face of a storm? ___________________________________ 
8. The following natural hazards are already impacting some ports in the US. Which ones are you most 
concerned about? How would you rank them? (4, high – 0, low): 
 __ Extreme Temperatures 
 __ Extreme Precipitation 
__ Sea level rise 
__ Extreme Coastal Storms (high winds and surge) 
__ Tidal flooding 
 
Other: ______________________________________________________________ 
   
S 3 Context in which the barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation are mentioned by 
the port decision makers  
In the following table the seven categories of barriers are presented. Each has sub-category, 
setting the context in which the barrier was mentioned. For example, the category lack of 
understanding of risks has six sub-categories. One is confusion over the level of risk and the 
difficulty of predicting where impacts will be. Under the sub-category responses by decision 
maker type, some distinct responses and differences in viewpoints of given groups were 
highlighted. In parenthesis the coded number and type for the respondent are noted, as follows: 
 
Table 1  Barriers to adaptation mentioned in different context. Numbers in the rows are percentages of the total 
number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision maker group that mentioned a strategy in the category at least 
one time. Colors denote high agreement (green) to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray). 
 DIR ES SP
n = 17 n = 8 n = 5
Confusion over the level of risk 18 25 20
    Difficulty of predicting where the impact will be 35 63 60
    Lack of awareness of risk 29 38 20
    Lack of experience with extreme events 59 38 60
 Political discord 20
    Lack of understanding of unintended consequences 47 63 40
    Cost of adaptation 24 38 60
     Environmental regulations increase costs 6
      Lack of funding (in general terms) 59 50 100
    Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold (in 
general terms)
12 13 20
    Agency culture not forward thinking 6 40
    Climate denialism 6 40
    Conflicting priorities (going green vs resilience) 6 13
    Lack of will to invest in the unknown 6 13 40
    Planning for future climate not necessary at present 29
    Resilience improvements impact business continuity 18 13
    Resilience investments are not a priority 35 60
    Complexity of refitting for resilience 24 50
    Existing facilities under-designed for present and 
future conditions
77 25 20
    Lack of practical solutions 18 25 20
    Port is restricted to its current location    (it can't 
move)
29 13
    Complexity of multi-entity planning 47 63
    Disincentives for resilience investment (FEMA) 6 13
    Lack of clarity over who should pay for resilience 12 13 20
    Lack of clarity over who will maintain or control 
resilience infrastructure
35 13 20
    Lack of direction from above 29 50 20
    Political pressure 6 13 40
    Seaports are not prioritized in large scale regional 
planning
24 13 40
6 13
6 137 - The problem is overwhelming  (13%)
4 - Physical constraints limit options (67%)
3 - Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold (70%)
2 - Lack of Funding (77%)
1 - Lack of Understanding Risks (93%)
5 -  Governance disconnect (67%)
6 - Lack of communication amongst individuals (13%)
S 4 Decision makers perceptions surrounding the vulnerability of their ports to climate change 
and extreme weather impacts.  
Vulnerability is defined as, “the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected . . . 
including the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influences their capacity 
to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the adverse effects of physical events” (IPCC 
2012, p. 32).  
Although, all groups mentioned vulnerability in terms of adaptive capacity, our assessment on 
decision makers’ perceptions of the concept of port vulnerability found that a majority (80%, 
24/30) explain it in terms of exposure and sensitivity (Table A1). However, safety planners had 
the largest percentage of its group (80%, 4/5) link vulnerability and adaptive capacity. An 
explanation could be that these individuals, who address port safety daily, most clearly see the 
connection between adaptive capacity and the ability to respond to an extreme weather event.   
Table S1  Distribution of the responses by the three categories of decision makers. Values are presented in the 
percentages for each group of respondents. The total number of respondents was 30. 
Components of 
Vulnerability 
Directors / Managers 
(N = 17) 
Environmental 
specialists (N = 8) 
Safety planners      
(N = 5) 
Exposure 82.4% 75% 80% 
Sensitivity 70.6% 87.5% 100% 
Adaptive Capacity 17.6% 25% 80% 
 
Port exposure to climate and extreme weather events was explained in terms of exposure to sea 
level rise (SLR), high winds, blizzards, and flooding events that could impact the physical 
infrastructure, facility, and cargo; and that could also affect vessels, people, and systems. 
Disruptions would slow down, delay, or prevent the port’s functioning, affecting the economic 
viability of the port and its ability to deliver goods. Together with the port, waterfront properties, 
waterways, and marshlands are also viewed as vulnerable and exposed. Similarly, in sensitivity 
terms, these surrounding areas, local population and key ecosystems would have a higher 
frequency of rain, storm, and surge impacts. Beyond impacts to physical infrastructure, extreme 
events also generate social and economic impacts. Depending on the nature and verity of the 
storm and the force of winds, the port’s function could be delayed or crippled. The weather event 
could also cause long term physical damage and shut downs. Stored cargo could be destroyed or 
lost. Coasts could experience erosion and channels could accumulate more than the usual 
sediments. 
 
 
